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  For a detailed recitation of the factual background of this case see,  United1
States v. Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d 547, 549-50 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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Maurice Richards appeals his conviction for “knowingly and willfully”
threatening to kill or inflict bodily harm on a member of the immediate family of a
former President, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(1).  For the reasons that follow, we
will reverse.
I.
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this
case, we need not set forth the factual or procedural background except insofar as is
helpful to our discussion.  1
After Richards waived his right to a jury trial, both he and the government filed
motions in limine to preclude certain evidence from being admitted based upon
3competing interpretations of the willfulness element of § 879.  Richards contended that
the statute requires a showing of subjective intent; i.e.  proof that he actually intended his
statements to be perceived as a threat.   However, the government argued it need only
establish that a reasonable observer would have perceived the statements as a threat to
satisfy its burden under of § 879.  Inasmuch as this  was to be a bench trial, the court
decided to reserve ruling on the motions and hear the disputed evidence with the
understanding that it would only consider the relevant evidence after determining
whether § 879 required proof of subjective intent as argued by Richards, or objective
intent as argued by the government.
The evidence at trial included the conflicting psychiatric testimony of Dr. Robert
Sadoff who testified for Richards, and Dr. Timothy Michals, who testified in rebuttal for
the government. Despite their disagreement on some issues, they agreed that Richards
was psychotic at the time of the incident that lead to his indictment.
Dr. Sadoff concluded that Richards’ “threats”  “were a product of his psychotic
thought disorder [and] were not clearly thought through.” App. 204. In his written report,
Dr. Sadoff had diagnosed Richards with “chronic schizophrenia, with paranoid features.” 
App. 353.   He opined that Richards’ statements were delusional, not specifically directed
toward anyone, and concluded that Richards did not intend to threaten Mrs. Clinton or
cause concern for her safety.  Id.  
Although Dr. Michals agreed that Richards was psychotic and “severely mentally
Procedurally, because the district court did not consider any psychiatric testimony2
based on its holding on the willfullness requirement, the district court granted the
government’s motion to preclude psychiatric testimony.  
4
disabled,” he disagreed with the diagnosis of schizophrenia with paranoid features. App.
271-72.  Dr. Michals believed that Richards made his statements about Mrs. Clinton
knowingly, and concluded that Richards had “some awareness” of his actions because he
stopped chanting about Hillary Clinton whenever Miller was in his line of sight.  App.
250-51. 
The district court convicted Richards of violating 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(1).  The
court reasoned that although some at the shelter were laughing at Richards, staff
members were sufficiently concerned to remove Richards from the shelter.  United States
v. Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d 547, 550-52 (E.D. Pa. 2005).  The district court found that
the statements were “knowingly” made insofar as they were made voluntarily and
intentionally, and not as the result of mistake, duress or coercion.  Id. at 552-53. It also
concluded that the willfulness element was satisfied. The court believed that the test for
willfulness is an objective one as the government had argued.  Thus, the government
only needed to prove that a reasonable person would perceive Richards’ statements as a
threat. Id. at 553-58.  Because the district court found that the test for willfulness is an
objective one, it did not consider the psychiatric testimony.   Id. at 559 n.6.   This appeal2
followed.
II. DISCUSSION
5The district court concluded that the willfulness element of § 879 only requires
objective intent.  More specifically, the district court held:
[T]he phrase “willfully” as used in § 879 requires only that the Government
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “a reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm upon or take the life of” Senator Clinton.
415 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (citing United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991)
(interpreting the term “willfully” in 18 U.S.C. § 871, threats against the President).  
In explaining how the evidence satisfied that standard, the court wrote:
It is clear that the people at the shelter who heard Defendant’s
threats perceived them as serious. . .  Miller notified the
shelter security personnel.  Miller also remained close at hand
when Blitman spoke to Defendant in case she needed further
assistance.  The people in the dinner line moved away from
Defendant as he made these threats. . .  and, at one point,
Miller himself registered fear.  All of these reactions are
evidence that reasonable people perceived Defendant’s
statements to be serious threats.
Most significantly, the staff at the shelter decided to remove
Defendant from the shelter.  They did not want to allow
someone who was talking about shooting Hillary Clinton and
killing white people to remain at the shelter overnight.  They
were afraid that he might lose control.  Defendant was
involuntarily committed at the Hall Mercer Clinic.
415 F. Supp. 2d at 558-59.  
Although Richards still contends that § 879 requires subjective intent, he assumes
arguendo for purposes of this appeal that the court’s objective test is correct, and he
“We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when deciding whether a3
[] verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence.”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187
(3d Cir. 1998).  “It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of
the witnesses.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “Rather, we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, and will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.
(citations and internal quotations omitted).  “Thus, a claim of insufficiency places a very
heavy burden on an appellant.”  Id.  (citation and internal quotations omitted).  
In United States v. 15 Bosworth Street, 236 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001), the court of4
appeals wrote:
When a district court conducts a bench trial, its legal determinations
engender de novo review.  This includes its determinations about the
sufficiency of the evidence.  In contrast, the court’s factual findings are
(continued...)
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argues that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy even that standard. We agree.3
The only two people who testified that they heard Richards chanting about putting
“bullets into Hillary Clinton” were case manager Miller and mental health clinician
Blitman.  Miller testified that he did not consider Richards’ chanting to be a serious
threat to Hillary Clinton, App. 131, and both testified that they saw no reason to be
concerned for Hillary Clinton’s safety. App. 113, 146.  Therefore, their reaction does not
satisfy the objective test.  We simply can not agree that the evidence establishes an
objective test for willfulness if the only people who heard Richard’s utterances about
Hillary Clinton did not regard them as serious threats and saw no reason to be concerned
for Hillary Clinton’s safety.  The court’s finding that “[i]t is clear that the people at the
shelter who heard Defendant’s threats perceived them as serious,” 415 F. Supp. 2d at
558, is simply not supported by the record and is therefore clearly erroneous.4
(...continued)4
entitled to considerable deference. . . . Despite the deference due, an
appellate court will displace factual findings in the aftermath of a bench
trial if those findings are clearly erroneous.
Id. at 53.  
7
The district court ignored testimony that neither Miller nor Blitman saw any
reason to be concerned for Senator Clinton’s safety.  Instead of addressing that
testimony, the court relied upon five “facts” that it believed established that the
willfulness  element of § 879.  First, the district court  noted that “Miller notified the
shelter personnel.” 415 F. Supp.2d at 558.  However, Miller made it clear that he notified
security pursuant to normal operating procedure, and not because he viewed anything
Richards said as a serious threat to anyone, let alone Hillary Clinton.  In fact he
emphasized that he did not  regard Richards as a threat. He explained: “I went to tell
security just that here was a potential issue, nothing to be worried about, . . . [T]his
wasn’t all that abnormal up to this point. . . I don’t think I stressed that where was
anything major going on.” App. 79-80.  Miller clarified that “similar incidents” requiring
him to alert security “were quite common at the shelter.”  App. 80. 
Second, the district court wrote that “Miller also remained close at hand when
Blitman spoke to Defendant in case she needed further assistance.”  415 F. Supp.2d at
558.  However, the district court failed to note that Miller was once again simply
following the shelter’s protocol. Miller testified that his reaction was: “[j]ust kind of
8standard . . . we just basically back each other up in whatever capacity we can.  So, if he
didn’t respond well to her or something like that, I would be right there.”
App. 20.   Given Miller’s explanation, we do not believe that his remaining “close at
hand” can support an inference that he took Richards’ chanting as a serious threat to
Hillary Clinton.  Rather, as Miller testified, his concern was for Richards’ mental health. 
App. 102.  
Third, the district court noted that “[t]he people in the dinner line moved away
from Defendant as he made these threats.”  415 F. Supp.2d at 558.  However, that hardly
supports the inference that the district court drew, even given our differential standard of
review.  Miller testified: “I think some people sitting close to him were . . . keeping a
little distance from him,” App. 69, and “I think they were moving away from him a little
bit, yes.” App. 129.  However, given Richards’ disheveled and malodorous state, it is not
surprising that people moved away from him when he became loud.  People normally
keep their distance from a disheveled, homeless person engaging in psychotic behavior. 
The fact that some people in the line moved away from Richards does not, without more,
support an inference that a reasonable observer would believe Richards was threatening
Hillary Clinton..  Moreover, any such inference is seriously undermined not only by the
totality of the circumstances including Richards’ disheveled state, but by the testimony of
Blitman and Purdie that some people near Richards were actually laughing at him. 
Fourth, the district court also noted that a “member of the staff was alarmed by the
9statements and, at one point, Miller himself registered fear.” 415 F. Supp.2d at 558.
However, that was not in response to Richards’ chants about Hillary Clinton. Rather, that
occurred after dinner, when Purdie and Miller spoke with Richards.  At that point,
Richards did not make any statements about Hillary  Clinton.  “He was just ranting about
white people.” App. 162.  He started screaming  about “cutting heads off” and “hating
white people.”  App. 86-87.   The alarm that certain people registered was a  reaction to
Richards’ racist and psychotic ranting.  Richards was no longer talking about shooting
Hillary Clinton, and there was no evidence that Brian heard the earlier statements about
Hillary Clinton. 
Lastly, the district court explained: “Most significantly, the staff at the shelter
decided to remove Defendant from the shelter.  They did not want to allow someone who
was talking about shooting Hillary Clinton and killing white people to remain at the
shelter overnight.  They were afraid he might lose control.”  415 F. Supp.2d at 558. Far
from being the most significant aspect of the government’s proof, we feel the reasoning
behind removing Richards from the shelter establishes conclusively that objective
observers did not take his ranting about Hillary Clinton seriously.  Miller testified that
they removed Richards and had him committed solely based on a concern for Richards’
health and safety, not because of any concern for the safety of Hillary Clinton. App. 102. 
The fact that Hillary Clinton is a white woman in no way establishes that Richards’
generalized rants about white women constitute threats to her within the meaning of §
10
879.
Miller testified, “I would not have felt comfortable, at the end of my shift,
knowing that somebody had just screamed things about, you know, killing people.” 
App. 118.  Miller immediately clarified that the screaming he was referring to did not
involve the statements about shooting Hillary Clinton.  The statements about Clinton
were “the mumbling and chanting to himself; and those were not the subject of the
screaming.”  App. 119.
Furthermore, the fact that the staff would simply have put Richards out on the
street if it had not been too cold to do so clearly establishes that they saw no reason to be
concerned for Hillary Clinton’s safety.  Miller testified that they opted for involuntary
commitment because it was cold outside and Miller “didn’t like the chances of
[Richards] finding a heating grate.”  App. 90.  Had the staff perceived his chanting about
Hillary Clinton to be a serious threat, they certainly would not have put him back on the
street where he would have access to all manner of weapons. 
Interestingly, the government does not directly address the fact that the only
people who heard Richards’ statements about Hillary Clinton were Miller and Blitman
and that they did not consider those statements to be serious.  Instead, the government
suggests that Miller’s and Blitman’s testimony is not that reliable because they work in a
homeless shelter and they hear people making threatening statements all the time.  In the
government’s view, they are much more tolerant than the average observer in reacting to
 Given our holding, we need not address whether Richards’ utterances constituted5
“true threats” or protected speech.  See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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threats.  However, we believe the reverse to be true.  Their background puts them in a far
better position to make an objective assessment of Richards’ behavior and utterances
than the average person who is unfamiliar with psychotic behavior. 
IV.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to
sustain Richard’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(1).  Therefore, we will
reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with instructions to vacate the
judgment of conviction and instruct the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal.5
